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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
ST A TE OF GEORGlA

FRANCES B. BUNZL; SUZANNE BUNZL
WfLNER, Individually, as Beneficiary of Bunzl
Trusts and as General Trustee; ANNA R.
WILNER, Individually, as Beneficiary of Bunzl
Trusts, and as General Trustee, and PATRICIA 1-l.
BUNZL, Individually and as General Trustee,

CJVIL ACTION NO.
20 l 3CY227097

Plaintiffs.
V.

JUDITH COCHRAN KJGHT. Individually and as
Guardian of adult ward BENNETT LEX ON
KIGHT, named in his Individual capacity and as
Member of the Committee for the Trust
Established by the Last Will and Testament of
Walter H. Bunzl and as former General and
Administrative Trustees for the Trust for the
Lineal Descendants of Walter Henry Bunzl.
former General and Administrative Trustees for
the Trust for Richard Charles Bunzl and his Lineal
Descendants, and former General and
Administrative Trustees for the Trust for Suzanne
Irene Bunzl and her Lineal Descendants;
WILLIAM C. LANKFORD, JR., in his Individual
capacity and as former General Trustee for the
Trust for the Lineal Descendants of Walter Henry
Bunzl, former General Trustee for the Trust for
Richard Charles Bunzl and his Lineal
Descendants, and former General Trustee for the
Trust for Suzanne Irene Bunzl and her Lineal
Descendants; ROBERT F. KIGHT; JOHN DOES
I THROUGH 100; PLAYMORE/WANTOOT
LLC; PLA YMORE TEN LLC; PLA YMORE
TRACT A LLC; PLAYMORE TRACT C LLC;
PLAYMORE TRACT D LLC; PLA YMORE
TRACT E LLC; PLA YMORE TRACT F LLC;
and PLA YMORE TRACT G LLC,

Bus. Case Div. 4

Defendants.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DETERMINATION
OF ADMlSSIBILITY OF DOCUMENTS

The above styled matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Determination of
Admissibility of Documents ("Motion"), wherein Plaintiffs ask the Court to hold that "any and
all documents produced in this lawsuit and provided to all parties ... area authentic and admissible
for the purposes ofO.C.G.A. §24-10-1006."1
On Feb. 8, 2013, former trustees Bennett L. Kight and William C. Lankford, Jr. ("Former
Trustees"), as General Trustees and/or Administrative Trustees of the Trust for Richard Charles
Bunzl and His Lineal Descendants, the Trust for Suzanne Irene Bunzl and Her Lineal
Descendants, and the Trust for the Lineal Descendants of Walter Henry Bunzl (collectively the
"Bunzl Trusts"), initiated this action by filing a Petition for Approval of Interim Accounting. On
Jun. 10, 2013, the Court issued its Order on Motion for Immediate Interlocutory Injunction,
where the Court granted in part and denied in part the Bunzls' request for equitable relief and
appointed Synovus Trust Company, N.A. as Receiver for the Bunzl Trusts. Therein the Court
also directed the Receiver to conduct an investigation and accounting of the assets of the Bunzl
Trusts:
The Receiver is directed to investigate and make an accounting of the
assets of the Bunzl Trusts. including any entities that own, control, hold or
possess interests in assets of the Bunzl Trusts, from 2005 to present,
including all compensation, loans and other interests received by the
[Former] Trustees from the Trusts from 2005 to the present. The [Fonner]
Trustees and the Bunzls shall cooperate with the investigation by the
Receiver and make themselves available for interviews by the Receiver.
The Receiver shall prepare a detailed written report summarizing the
results of the investigation. 2
The Final Transaction Narrative Report of the Receiver, Synovus Trust Company, N.A.
("Final Report") was issued on Aug. 13, 2015. Plaintiffs assert that between the appointment of
the Receiver on Jun. 10. 2013 and issuance of the Final Report on Aug. 13, 2015, the Former

Plaintiffs' Motion, pp. 1-2.
Order on Motion for Immediate Interlocutory Injunction, pp. 6-7.
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Trustees produced over 38,000 documents to Plaintiffs and to the Receiver. Plaintiffs further
assert that during the course of this and related litigation, various parties have produced
approximateJy 400.000 pages of documents. Plaintiffs cite to 91 specific documents that have
been produced which they assert largely consist of, inter alia, banking records, Quickbooks
documents, real estate transaction records. business entity formation documents. and operating
agreements (collectively the "Subject Documents"); documents which Plaintiffs contend should
be considered automatically admissible under O.C.G.A. §24-8-803.
Plaintiffs intend to introduce the Subject Documents through the use of summaries and
summary witnesses under O.C.G.A. §24-10-1006 which allows the introduction of "[t]he
contents of otherwise admissible voluminous writings ... in the form of a chart, summary, or
calculation." Plaintiffs' witnesses have not yet created the actuaJ summaries to be used at trial
and Plaintiffs assert such will be submitted pursuant to a pretriaJ order at which time Defendants
will have the opportunity to argue the admissibility of the actual summary(ies) to be introduced.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs ask the Court to find at this juncture that the underlying Subject
Documents are "otherwise admissible" as contemplated under O.C.G.A. §24-10-1006 so that the
parties can present their cases through summarizes and summary witnesses.
Defendants each oppose Plaintiffs' Motion, generally asserting: Plaintiffs are conflating
the issues of authentication and admissibility, which must be separately established before
documents may be admitted into evidence; Plaintiffs have not presented any testimony,
certification, affidavit or other evidence that would establisb the foundational requirements for
the admission of the Subject Documents, whether under the business records exception to
hearsay or otherwise; and an individualized review is required to cletennine whether each
document is admissible. The Court is compelled to agree.
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Plaintiffs ask the Courl to find that the Subject Documents "are authentic and admissible
for the purposes of O.C.G.A. §24-10-1006." 3 That code section provides:

The contents of otherwise admissible voluminous writings, recordings,
or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be
presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or
duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by
other parties at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that the
contents of such writings, recordings, or photographs be produced in
court.
(Emphasis added). See Milich, Ga. Rules of Evidence § 8:4 (''When pertinent facts can be
ascertained only by the examination of voluminous records, a party may present a written
summary of the facts gleaned from those records if (I) the underlying records are
voluminous, (2) the underlying records are made available to the court and the parties, (3) the
underlying records would be admissible at trial, (4) the summary must be accurate and
nonprejudicial, (5) the person who supervised the preparation of the summary testifies at trial
and is available for cross-examination") (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Bray, 139
F.3d 1104, 1109 (6th Cir. I 998) (describing the foregoing as "preconditions" to admit a Rule
1006 summary under the substantially similar federal rule). Thus, under the express language of
the statute the "voluminous" materials upon which Plaintiffs' anticipated sununaries will be
predicated must be "otherwise admissible" in order for the information to be presented in

summary form under §24-10-2006.
It is axiomatic that
"[a] proper foundation must be laid for the introduction of documentary
evidence." (Citations and punctuation ornitted.) Hill Aircraft &c. Corp. v.
Cintas Corp., 169 Ga.App. 747, 748(1 ), 315 S.E.2d 263 (1984) (physical
precedent only). "As a general rule, a writing will not be admitted into
evidence unless the offering party tenders proof of the authenticity or
genuineness of the writing. [Cit.] There is no presumption of
authenticity, and the burden of proof rests upon the proffering party
Plaintiffs' Motion. p. 2.
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to establish a prima facie case of genuineness ... " Martin v. State, 135
Ga.App. 4, 6-7(3), 217 S.E.2d 312 ( 1975).
Davis v. First Healthcare Corp .. 234 Ga. App. 744,746,507 S.E.2d 563. 565 (1998) (emphasis
added).
With respect to authentication, O.C.G.A. §24-9-90 I (a) provides: "The requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility shall be satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
Under long-standing Georgia law, "[t]he process known as authentication
of writings is the means by which a writing is shown to be in fact what it
purports to be in order to introduce it in evidence." (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Conso.lidated Freightways Corp. v. Synchroflo.
Inc., 164 Ga.App. 275, 277(1), 294 S.E.2d 643 (1982). "Authentic" does
not mean that the document is a legally valid or enforceable instrument;
authenticity is merely a matter of "identification, or showing that this
writing is the one in question." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
The Evidence Code recognizes a wide variety of means by which a party
may authenticate a writing; the use of circumstantial evidence is one of
these methods. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-90l(b) (listing "[b]y way of illustration
only, and not by way of limitation" ten means of authentication or
identification conforming with the requirements of the section).
Production of a document by a party during discovery, along with
other circumstantial evidence, is evidence of authenticity, particularly
when the party who produced the document never claims it is not
authentic or genuine. Gulfsh·eam Aerospace Svcs. Corp. v. U.S. Aviation
Underwriters, 280 Ga.App. 747, 760(2)(b), 635 S.E.2d 38 (2006); Salinas
v. Skelton, 249 Ga.App. 217, 220-221(1). 547 S.E.2d 289 (2001); Davis
v. First Healthcare Corp., 234 Ga.App. 744, 747(1 ), 507 S.E.2d 563
( l 998). The appearance and content of a document may also be
circumstantial evidence of authenticity. O.C.G .A. § 24-9-90 l (b )(4)
("(a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances"); Nyankojo v. N.
Star Capital Acquisition, 298 Ga.App. 6, 8, 679 S.E.2d 57 (accord); Davis
v. First Healthcare Corp., 234 Ga.App. at 747(1 ), 507 S.E.2d 563 (2009)
(accord).
Koules v. SP5 Atl. Retail Ventures. LLC, 330 Ga. App. 282, 286-87, 767 S.E.2d 40, 44 (2014)
(footnote omitted; emphasis added). "The party proffering the evidence must present sufficient
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evidence to make out a prima facie case that the proffered evidence is what it purports to be.
Once that prima facie case is established, the evidence is admitted and the ultimate question of
authenticity is decided by the jury." Johnson v. State, 821 S.E,2d 76, 85 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)
(citing Smith v. State, 300 Ga. 538, 541 (2) (b), 796 S.E.2d 666(2017)).
Here, it appears some of the Subject Documents have been produced during discovery by
parties to this action and others have been produced by non-parties. Even as to the documents
produced by parties. their mere production-absent "other circumstantial evidence"-is
insufficient circumstantial evidence to support their wholesale authentication and admission. No
testimony, affidavit, or other evidence has been submitted that would support their authentication.
Further, the Subject Documents themselves have not been provided to the Court with the Motion
such that other potential circumstances supporting their authentication (e.g., appearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, etc.) cannot be assessed. Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs' arguments,
the fact that some of the Subject Documents were produced by former trustees-who have the
general duty to "keep full, accurate, and orderly records" (Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, §962,
pp. 10- 13 (2d ed. 1962))-is not a compelling circwnstance supporting authentication in light of
the extensive fraud and misconduct Plaintiffs allege the Former Trustees, here, engaged in and
upon which their claims are predicated. Based on the existing record, the cannot simply determine
that the Subject Documents have been properly authenticated.
As to the admissibility of the Subject Documents, Plaintiffs urge "[a] great many of the
documents in the record in this case" are "documents [that] should be considered automatically
admissible under O.C.G.A. §24-8-803[6],"4 one of the exceptions to hearsay.
"In order for hearsay to be admissible, it must faU within one of the statutory hearsay
exceptions, and the moving party has the burden of establishing that one of the exceptions
Plaintiffs' Motion, p. 15.
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applies." Jones v. State, 345 Ga. App. 14, 16, 812 S.E.2d 337, 340 (2018) (citing Phillips v.
State, 275 Ga. 595, 598, 571 S.E.2d 361 (2002)). Commonly known as the business records
exception, O.C.G.A. §24-8-803(6) provides in relevant part:
The following shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness .... (6) Unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness and subject to the provisions of Chapter 7 of this title, a
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, if (A) made at or near
the time of the described acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses;
(B) made by, or from information transmitted by, a person with personal
knowledge and a business duty to report; (C) kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity; and (D) it was the regular practice
of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness or by certification that complies with paragraph (11)
or (12) of Code Section 24-9-902 or by any other statute permitting
certification. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes any
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. ..
(Emphasis added). Once the "foundational elements" of O.C.G.A. §24-8-803(6) are satisfied, "a
rebuttable presumption of trustworthiness of the evidence is created" and U1e burden shifts to any
party opposing its admission to rebut the presumption. Thompson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 204,
210, 770 S.E.2d 364, 371 (2015) (citation omitted). See also D'Agnese v. Wells Fargo Bank.
N.A., 335 Ga. App. 659, 662, 782 S.E.2d 714, 717 (2016) ("[B]usiness records generally are
admissible as an exception to hearsay found at O.C.G.A. §24-8-803(6) in Georgia's Evidence
Code, with the trial court vested with the discretion to determine whether a proper foundation
was laid for use of the exception and whether the circumstances of the document's preparation
indicate trustworthiness") ( citation and footnote omitted).
Here, the "foundational elements" of O.C.G.A. §24-8-803(6) have not been satisfied.
Plaintiffs summarily assert that certain business documents produced in this case (generally
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described by Plaintiffs as "banking records, Quickbooks documents, business transaction
records, business entity formation documents, operating agreements, loan documents, deed
records, etc.") as well as documents produced by Miller & Martin and Sutherland Asbill &
Brennan were kept in the normal course of business in representing the Bunzl-related entities and
meet the requirements of the business records exception. However, Plaintiffs have not submitted
any "certification" or "testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness" establishing that the
requirements of O.C.G.A. §24-8-803(6) have been met with respect to each record at issue.
Absent such, the Court cannot find the Subject Documents are admissible under O.C.G.A. §24-8803(6).
Although the complexity of the transactions at issue and the number of potentially
relevant documents in this and the related litigation will require careful consideration by the
parties as to how to efficiently lay the foundation for and present evidence, their admission into
evidence is still governed by the requirements of Georgia law. The sheer volume of potential
evidence in this litigation, while "overwhelming" as accurately described by Plaintiffs, cannot
shadow or blurry applicable and binding law.
Having considered the record and given all of the above, .Plaintiffs' Motion is hereby
DENIED. However, the parties are directed to confer in good faith regarding the Subject
Documents (and any other documents the parties intend to use or introduce) to determine if any
genuine dispute exists as to their authenticity and admissibility. Further, the parties are reminded
that the assertion of an objection to discovery without a good faith basis therefor may subject that
party to sanctions. 5

Case Management Order, p. 4; Amended Case Management Order, p. 4.
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SO ORDERED this_c'ctay of March, 2019.

Ft on County Superior Court
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Served 011 registered service contacts through eFileGA

.

Attorneys .for Plaintiffs

,.

F. Edwin Hallman, Jr.
Richard A. Wingate
HALLMAN & WIN GA TE LLC
166 Anderson Street, S.E., Suite 210
Marietta, GA 30060
ehallman@hallmanwingate.com
rwi ngate@hal I manwi agate.com

~-

At.torneys for Defendants

--- ,,_·~

Counselfor Judith Cochran Kight in her capacity
as Conservator and Guardian ofadult ward
Bennett Lexon Kight, Playmore/Wantoot LLC,
Playmore Ten LLC, Playmore Tract A LLC,
Playmore Traci C LLC, Playmore Traci D LLC,
and Playmore Tract E LLC:
Barry J. Armstrong
Mark A. Silver
Maxwell R. Jones
Taylor M. Koshak
DENTONS US LLP
303 Peachtree Street, Suite 5300
Atlanta, GA 30308
(404) 527-4000
barry.armstronu@dentons.com
mark.silver@dentons.com
max.jones@dentons.com
tavlor.koshak@dentons.com

Anthony C. Lake
Craig A. GiJJen
GILLEN WITHERS & LAKE, LLC
400 Galleria Parkway, Suite 1920
Atlanta, GA 30339
ac lake@gw1 la w:firm. com
cui llen(ci),awllawfirm.com

Counselfor Judith Cochran Kight, Individually:
Bruce P. Brown
BRUCE P. BROWN LAW, LLC
1123 Zonolite Rd., N.E., Suite 6
Atlanta, Georgia 30306
Tel: (404) 881-0700
bbrown@brucepbrownlav,1.corn
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Counselfor William C. Lankford:
David J. Larson
Ross D. Ginsberg
Amber E. Tuggle

WEINBERG, WHEELER, HUDGINS,
GUNN & DIAL, LLC
3344 Peachtree Road, N.E., Suite 2400
Atlanta, Georgia 30326
Tel: (404) 876-2700
dlarson<@wwbgd.com
rgi nsberg@wwh 2.d. com
atuggle@.wwhgd.com

Counsel/or Robert L. Kight:
Robert C. Khayat, Jr.
Khayat Law Finn
75 Fourteenth Street, N.E., Suite 2750
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Tel: (404) 978-2750
Fax: (404) 978-2901
rkhayat(a),khayallawiirm.com
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